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Lecture 10 – Internatinaa Ecinimics
Trade Piaicy in the Reaa Wirad
Preview
• What are the politcal motiatons behind trade policy?
– A quick oieriiew on a few releiant models of politcal economy
• Internatonal Trade Policies
– The World Trade Organizaton and its Trade Policy
– Preferental Trade Agreements
• Trade policy in deieloping countries
– Import Substtuton is. Export Promoton
• A critcal discussion
– Free Trade, Trade Actiism, and Ant Globalizaton Moiements
Piaitcaa Ecinimy: the Hiteaaing-Diwns midea
• Politcal partes aim at piwer, and they choose a politcal program that 
maximizes the probability of winning the electons.
• In equilibrium, they positon themselies in the middle of the ideological 
spectrum (where the median viter stands).
• Suppose the leiel of a tarif rate is the policy issue.
– Thus, the median ioter theorem implies that a two-party democracy 
should enact trade policy based on how many ioters it pleases.
– A policy that inficts large losses on a few people (import-competng 
producers) but benefts a large number of people (consumers) should 
be chosen…
– ...But this is not the case: trade policy is hardly an electoral issue 
(migraton, corrupton, the Euro, etc. are more important).
Piaitcaa Ecinimy: Ciaaectve Actin and aibbying
• Politcal actiity is ofen described as a ciaaectve actin pribaem: 
– While consumers as a group haie an incentie to adiocate free trade, 
each individual consumer has no incentie because her/his beneft is 
not large compared to the cost required to adiocate free trade.
– Policies that impose aarge aisses fir siciety as a whiae but smaaa 
aisses in each individuaa may therefore not face strong oppositon.
• Collectie acton stems from groups who sufer large losses from free 
trade (for example, unemployment due to export competton).
– In this case, the cost and tme required to adiocate restricted trade is 
small compared to the cost of unemployment: strong incentie to 
adiocate the policy s/he desires.
– It is mire aikeay ti ibserve ciaaectve actin against free trade.
• Economic interests of groups willing to adiocate a special interest policy 
through aibbying actvity.
Which Industries Are Pritected?
• Agricuature: In the US, EU, and Japan, farmers make up a small fracton of 
the electorate but receiie generous subsidies and trade protecton.
– European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy, Japan’s 1000% tarif on 
imported rice, US’s sugar quota.
• Caithing: textles (fabricaton of cloth) and apparel (assembly of cloth into 
clothing): it is Labor intensiie and low-tech: aiw wage ciuntries have a big 
cimparatve advantage.
– Untl 2005, quota licenses specifed in the Mult-Fiber Agreement 
between the US and many other natons.
– Phase-out of MFA in 2005 drastcally reduced the costs of US 
protecton, from 14.1b in 2001 (80% from textles and apparel) to 4.6b 
in 2013.
The US Tarif Rate
Internatinaa Negitatins if Trade Piaicy
• Afer rising sharply at the beginning of the 1930s, the aierage US tarif rate 
has decreased substantally since the mid-1930s.
• Since 1944, much of the reducton in tarifs and other trade restrictons has 
come about through internatonal negotatons.
– The Generaa Agreement if Tarifs and Trade was begun in 1947 as a 
proiisional internatonal agreement and was replaced by a more 
formal internatonal insttuton called the Wirad Trade Organizatin in 
1995.
• Why is it easier to lower tarifs as part of a mutual agreement? Two reasons
– Muataateraa negitatins mibiaize expirters to support free trade if 
they belieie export markets will expand. This support would be lacking 
in a unilateral push for free trade.
– The exporters support counteracts the support for restricted trade by 
import-competng groups.
Internatinaa Negitatins if Trade Piaicy (2)
• Multlateral negotatons also help aviid a trade war between countries, 
where each country enacts trade restrictons.
• A trade war could result if each country has an incentie to adopt 
protecton regardless of what other countries do.
– Typicaa prisiner’s diaemma: all countries approie trade restrictons, 
even if it is in the interest of all countries to have free trade.
– Countries need an agreement that prevents a trade war or eliminates 
the protecton from one.
• If two countries can establish a binding agreement to maintain free trade, 
both can aioid the temptaton of protecton and both can be made beter of.
– Or, if the damage has already been done, both countries can agree to 
return to free trade.
• Bilateral negotatons, howeier, do not take full adiantage of internatonal 
coordinaton.
– Benefts can “spiaaiver” to countries that haie not made any 
concessions.
Muataateraa negitatins: the GATT and the Wirad 
Trade Organizatin
• Gaibaa ecinimic givernance to be planned at the end of the World 
War II: IMF, WB and an organizaton to superiise trade.
– Politcal problems stopped the third organizaton
– In 1947, a group of 23 countries began trade negotatons under a 
proiisional set of rules that became known as the Generaa Agreement 
in Tarifs and Trade, ir GATT.
• With almost 50 years of delay, in 1994, the Wirad Trade Organizatin, 
or WTO, was established as a formal internatonal organizaton for 
implementng multlateral trade negotatons (and policing them).
• It starts functoning on the 1st of January 1995 and now has 164 
member countries.
WTO – Giaas and principaes 
● Giaas: Ti deveaip a reaiabae system if ruaes fir internatinaa trade, in irder ti 
stmuaate ecinimic griwth:
 Advicatng internatonal free trade;
 Minitiring natonal trade-related policies and assistng 
goiernments on trade policies;
 Setaing internatonal disputes
 Principaes: Theiry if Cimparatve advantages: free trade is a win-win 
situatin and trade aimitatins shiuad be graduaaay abiaished.
 Principle of the Mist Faviurite Natin, to garantee equity of treatment
 Principle of Ni Discriminatin between domestc and foreign frms
 Eaiminate tarif and nin-tarif barriers in accessing local markets
 Ruaes are cimpuasiry, aioid discretonary policies
WTO - Decisiin and current situatin
● The WTO works through a system of biennaa riunds which end with the Ministerial 
Conference: in each round, bilateral requests and ofers of liberalizaton are discussed 
and mediated.
● The conference merges eierything in a unique treaty that has to be approied and then 
ratfed by natonal bodies
● Strong normatie principle: since free trade should be Pareti Optmaa, decisions haie to 
be taken with Uninaminity, whit the principle one country, one iote.
● Since the No Global moiement and the recent alliance of deieloping countries, it is 
almost impossible to take decisions. Seatle 1999, Cancun 2003, Hong Kong 2005… 
Only Doha 2001 ratfed some decisions. Back in track since Nairibi 2015?
● Behind the discussions, there are strong natonal interests: rich countries ask for 
aiberaaizatin if services (fnancial seriices, in partcular); poor countries ask for 
aiberaaizatin if agricuature; China (and other emerging countries) ask for 
aiberaaizatin if manufacturing.
WTO appriach ti trade piaicy
• WTO negotatons address trade restrictons in at least 3 ways:
– Reducing tarif rates through multlateral negotatons.
– Binding tarif rates: a tarif is “bound” by haiing the imposing country 
agree not to raise it in the future
– Eaiminatng nintarif barriers: quotas and export subsidies are 
changed to tarifs because the costs of tarif protecton are more 
apparent and easier to negotate.
– Subsidies for agricultural exports are an excepton.
– Exceptons are also allowed for “market disruptons” caused by a 
surge in imports..
WTO agreements 
• GATT: Generaa Agreement in Tarifs and Trade:  coiers trade in goods.
• GATS: Generaa Agreement in Tarifs and Services: coiers trade in 
seriices (ex., insurance, legal seriices, banking, but also health, educaton, 
pensions).
• TRIPS: Agreement in Trade-Reaated Aspects if Inteaaectuaa Priperty: 
coiers internatonal property rights (ex., patents and copyrights). Very 
controiersial issue encompassing biipiratery.
• The Dispute Setaement Tribunaa: a procedure where countries in a trade 
dispute can bring their case to a panel of WTO experts to rule upon.
– The panel decides whether member countries are breaking WTO 
agreements. A country that refuses to adhere to the panel’s decision 
may be punished by the WTO allowing other countries to impose 
trade restrictons on its exports.
Percentage Distributin if Pitentaa 
Gains frim Free Trade
Preferentaa Trading Agreements
• Preferentaa trade agreements are trade agreements between countries 
in which they lower tarifs for each other but not for the rest of the world.
• Under the WTO, such trade policies are generally not allowed:
– Under WTO the “mist favired natin” (MFN) principle applies.
– An excepton is allowed only if the lowest tarif rate is set at zero.
• Two types of preferental agreements with tarif rates set at or near zero:
– A free trade area: an agreement that allows free trade among 
members, but each member can haie its own trade policy towards 
non-member countries. Customs are kept and ‘rules of origin’ are 
specifed (e.g. the North America Free Trade Agreement – NAFTA).
– A custims uniin: an agreement that allows free trade among 
members and requires a common external trade policy towards non-
member countries (e.g. the European Union).
Preferentaa Trading Agreements (2) 
• Are preferental trading agreements increasing natonal welfare?
– Nit necessariay. It is possible that natonal welfare decreases under a 
preferental trading agreement.
– How? Rather than gaining tarif reienue from inexpensiie imports 
from world markets, a country may import expensiie products from 
member countries but not gain any tarif reienue.
– Preferental trading agreements increase natonal welfare when new 
trade is created, but not when existng trade from the outside world is 
diierted to trade with member countries.
• Trade creatin occurs when high-cost domestc producton is replaced by 
low-cost imports from other members.
• Trade diversiin occurs when low-cost imports from non-members are 
diierted to high-cost imports from member natons.
Mercisur
• Mercosur: free trade area formed in 1991 by Argentna, Brasil, Paraguay 
and Uruguay.
– Trade within Mercosur tripled in four years.
– Much of this was trade diversiin
– Consumers bought expensiie manufactured goods from neighboring 
countries rather than cheaper but highly tarifed goods from the rest 
of the world.
– According to estmates in the mid ‘90s, gains from forming Mercosur 
were close to zero if not negatie.
Trade Piaicies in Deveaiping Ciuntries
• Are there specifc trade policies suited for deieloping countries?
– “Deveaiping ciuntries”: iague name ofen used for low- and middle-
income countries.
– More trendy term: “Emerging Markets”
• Two main strategies to promote deielopment through industrializaton:
– Impirt Substtutin Industriaaizatin (ISI)
– Expirt primitin (Expirt-Led Griwth, ELG)
• Why not both at the same tme?
– By raising terms of trade, a tarif discourages exports.
– By decreasing terms of trade, an export subsidy fosters imports
•  Impirtance if innivatin in growth and deielopment. Does trade foster 
learning, innoiaton and learning?
– Yes: FDI, capital fows, reierse engineering.
– No: specializaton in low-learning sectors.
Impirt-Substtutng Industriaaizatin
• Import-substtutng industrializaton was a trade policy adopted by many 
low- and middle-income countries before the 1980s.
• The policy encouraged domestc industries by limitng competng imports.
• Reason: comparatie adiantage in raw materials, fuels, minerals, food and 
simple labor intensiie goods may lead to speciaaize in sectirs with aiw 
griwth pitentaa (and leading to immiserizing growth).
• The justfcaton of this policy was/is the infant industry argument: 
– Countries may haie a potental comparatie adiantage in some 
industries, but these industries cannot initally compete with well-
established industries in other countries.
– To allow these industries to establish themselies, goiernments should 
temporarily support them untl they haie grown strong enough to 
compete internatonally (industriaa piaicy and impirt tarifs)
Pribaems with the Infant Industry Argument
 It may be wasteful to support industries niw when comparatie 
adiantage will unfold in the future.
– For instance, it may be beter not to enter a capital intensiie 
industry when the country is labor abundant, and to wait untl 
capital accumulaton makes it capital abundant.
– With protecton, infant industries may never “griw up” or become 
compettie.
– There is no justfcaton for goiernment interienton unless there is 
a market failure that preients the priiate sector from iniestng in 
the infant industry.
– Two arguments for how market failures preient infant industries 
from becoming compettie:
• Imperfect fnancial market
• The problem of appropriability
Infant Industries and Market Faiaures 
 Imperfect fnanciaa asset markets: Because of poorly working 
fnancial laws and markets (and more generally, a lack of property 
rights), local frms haie no sufcient funds to iniest in their 
producton processes.
 If creatng beter functoning markets and enforcing laws is not 
feasible, then high tarifs wiuad be a secind-best piaicy to 
increase profts in new industries, leading to more rapid growth.
 The pribaem if appripriabiaity: Firms may not be able to priiately 
appropriate the social benefts of their iniestment in new industries 
because those benefts might be public goods, for example because of 
a lack of property rights or because of externalites.
– If establishing a system of property rights is not feasible, then high 
tarifs wiuad be a secind-best piaicy to encourage growth in new 
industries.
Impirt-Substtutng Industriaaizatin - Discussiin 
• Did import-substtutng industrializaton promote economic deielopment?
– No (Latn America, the 1950s, the 1960s), when Import-substtuton 
industrializaton iniolied costs and primited wastefua use if 
resiurces: (complex, tme-consuming regulatons); set high tarif rates 
for consumers, including frms that needed to buy imported inputs for 
their products; It promoted inefciently small industries and fostered 
corrupton and bad macroeconomic policies.
– Yes (South-East Asia, the 1970s and 1980s) when ISI was used a 
structural policy to deielop compettie industries and gain from 
potental compettie adiantages.
– Tempirary use, twinned with strong iniestment policies in educaton 
and the ability to quickly shif policies following the dynamics of the 
domestc industrial structure.
– Hot debate on whether South-East Asia is a case for ISI ir ELG
Trade Liberaaizatin in Deveaiping Ciuntries
• Some deieloping countries had relatiely free trade and higher aierage 
economic growth than those that followed import substtuton.
– For instance, between the 50’s and 70’s India, Pakistan and Argentna 
grew much more slowly that Hong Kong, South Korea and Singapore.
• By the mid-1980s, many givernments began to liberalize trade.
– Trade liberalizaton in deieloping countries occurred along with a 
dramatc increase in the iolume of trade.
– The share of trade in GDP has tripled oier 1970–1998, with most of 
the growth happening afer 1985. 
– The share of manufactured goods in deieloping-country exports 
surged, coming to dominate the exports of the biggest deieloping 
economies.
– A number of deieloping countries haie achieied extraordinary 
growth while becoming more, not less, open to trade.
Griwth if Deveaiping-Ciuntry Trade
Expirt-Led Griwth
• Has trade liberalizaton promoted deielopment? The evidence is mixed.
– Growth rates in Brazil and other Latn American countries haie been 
slower since trade liberalizaton than they were during import-
substtutng industrializaton. 
– But unstable macroeconomic policies and fnancial crises (Mexico 
1982, East Asia 1997, Russia 1998, Brasil 1999, Argentna 2001) 
contributed to slower growth since the 1980s.
– Other countries like India haie grown rapidly since liberalizing trade in 
the 1980s, but it is unclear to what degree liberalized trade 
contributed to growth. 
– Some economists also argue that trade liberalizaton has contributed 
to income inequality, as the Heckscher-Ohlin model predicts.
Trade and Griwth in Asia 
• Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, 
Indonesia, and China haie experienced rapid growth in iarious export 
sectors and rapid economic growth in general.
• These high-performance Asian economies generated a high iolume of 
exports and imports relatie to total producton.
• Their policy reforms were followed by a large increase in openness, as 
measured by their share of exports in GDP.
• So it is possible to deielop through export-oriented growth. Howeier, 
Latn American natons such as Mexico and Brazil, which also sharply 
liberalized trade and shifed toward exports, did not see comparable 
economic takeofs.
• These Latn American results suggest that other factors must haie played 
a crucial role in the Asian miracle.
The Asian Takeif
Source: Total Economy Database.
The Asian Takeif (2)
The Asian Takeif (3)
• It is unclear if the high iolume of exports and imports caused rapid 
economic growth, or was merely correlated with rapid economic growth, 
or, on the contrary, it is growth causing openness to trade. 
• High saiing and iniestment rates could haie led to both rapid economic 
growth in general and rapid economic growth in export sectors. 
• Very impirtant debate on whether the Asian Takeof could be seen at the 
light of ISI or ELG policies.
• These natons also undertook ither ecinimic refirms (educaton, market 
regulaton, etc.)
• Historically, countries first deveaiped, then ipened...
• ...But economic conditons greatly changed now compared to the XIX and 
XX century.
Cintriversies in Trade Piaicies
• Arguments for “actiist” trade policies (goiernment policies that actiely 
support export industries through subsidies) are:
– Externaaity ir appripriabiaity pribaem
– Strategic trade piaicy with imperfect cimpettin
• Arguments for actiist trade policies use similar assumptons than ISI and 
and the cases against free trade: market failure.
• Ant-globalizaton arguments
– Trade and low-wage labor
– Trade and the labour and eniironmental standards
– Trade and culture
Actvist Trade Piaicies
• Firms that iniest in new technology generally create knowledge that other 
frms (and in general, the society) can use without paying for it: it is an 
appripriabiaity pribaem. Knowledge is a public good.
– An appropriability problem is an example of a positie externaaity.
– An externality implies that the marginal social beneft of an 
iniestment is not represented by the producer surplus.
– Goiernments may want to actiely encourage iniestment when 
externalites in new technologies create a high marginal social beneft 
(e.g. deveaipment)
– Heated debate in the U.S. in the ‘80s on subsidies to high-tech 
industries.
– Fear that Japan would dominate the entre semiconductor industry, 
but it proied wrong.
Techniaigy and Externaaites 
• When considering whether a goiernment should subsidize high-
technology industries, consider:
• The ability of goiernments to subsidize the cirrect actvity.
– Much actiity by high tech frms does not create new technology 
(e.g., equipment purchases or non-technical workers hiring).
– Knowledge and innoiaton are also created in industries that are 
not high tech.
– Promising sectors may end up not producing releiant 
externalites or profts (e.g., semiconductors were promising in 
the 80s but a commodity industry by the 90s).
– Subsidies and protecton may end up being piaitcaaay captured 
by declining sectors, with mature technologies and few 
externalites, rather than by innoiatie and growing sectors.
Techniaigy and Externaaites (2)
● Subsidizing industries ir R&D (e.g. by tax deductons)?
● Research and deielopment expenses can usually be deducted from 
corporate taxable income.
● The ecinimic impirtance if externaaites.
– It is difcult to determine the quanttatie importance that 
externalites haie on the economy.
– Therefore, it is difcult to say hiw much to subsidize actiites 
that create externalites.
● Externaaites may iccur acriss ciuntries as weaa.
– Global externalites. No indiiidual country has an incentie to 
subsidize industries if all countries could take adiantage of the 
externalites generated in a country.
Imperfect Cimpettin and  Strategic Trade Piaicy
• Imperfectly compettie industries are typically dominated by a few frms 
that generate monopoly profts or excess prifts.
– Excess profts are reienues exceeding opportunity costs: profts higher 
than what equally risky iniestments elsewhere in the economy earn.
– In a monopolistc competton industry, zero profts are due to free 
entry, but entry barriers can lead to oligopolistc profts.
• In an imperfectly compettie industry, goiernment subsidies can shif 
excess profts  from a foreign frm to a domestc frm.
– A goiernment policy to giie a domestc frm a strategic adiantage in 
producton is called a strategic trade piaicy.
Imperfect Cimpettin and 
Strategic Trade Piaicy (2) 
• Critcisms of this analysis include:
– The use of strategic trade policy requires more informaton about 
frms than is aiailable. Hence, predictons might be dead wrong.
– What if goiernments or economists are not exactly right when 
predictng the profts of frms?
• Fireign retaaiatin also could result:
– This would deter neither frm from producing, start a trade war, and 
waste public funds.
– Strategic trade policy is a of beggar-thy-neighbir policy (it creates an 
adiantage for domestc frms at the expense of foreign frms).
– Strategic trade policy, like any trade policy, could be manipulated by 
piaitcaaay piwerfua griups. 
Trade and Liw-Wage Labir
• Manufactured exports from deieloping countries haie been increasing.
• Compared to rich-country standards, workers who produce these goods 
are paid aiw wages and ofen work under piir cinditins.
• ‘No global’ accusatons to free trade:
– It displaces jobs and hurts low skilled workers in rich countries.
– It leads to workers exploitaton in poor countries.
– Example of Maquilladoras: Mexican frms close to the U.S. border that 
produce for export to the U.S.
– Opponents of the North American Free Trade Agreement haie argued 
that NAFTA makes it easier for employers to replace low-wage 
workers in the U.S. with low-wage workers in Mexico.
– That is partally true, but can we conclude that trade hurts workers?
Trade and Liw-Wage Labir (2) 
• A Ricardian model predicts that while wages in Mexico should remain 
lower than those in the U.S. due to low productiity in Mexico, they wiaa 
rise reaatve ti their pre-trade aevea.
• A Heckscher-Ohlin model predicts that unskilled workers in the U.S. lose 
from NAFTA, but also predicts that unskilled workers in Mexico gain.
• Both theories predict that those workers are beter iff with trade than 
they would be if trade had not taken place.
• Eiidence consistent with these predictons would show that wages in 
maquiladoras haie risen relatie to wages in other Mexican sectors.
• Remember the efect of FDI (Feenstra-Hanson model)? Inequality might 
rise in the both the host and the guest country.
• Eiidence suggests that openness to trade per se is good for poierty 
reducton, but openness to fnancial trade is bad.
Labiur and Envirinmentaa Standards 
• Some labor actiists want to include labor and eniironmental standards in 
trade negotatons.
– Howeier, standards impised by fireign ciuntries are opposed by 
goiernments of low- and middle-income countries.
– Internatonal standards could be used as a protectonist policy by high 
income countries and would be expensiie for low- and middle-income 
producers.
• A policy that could be agreeable for goiernments of low- and middle-
income countries is a system that minitirs wages and wirking cinditins 
and makes this informaton aiailable to consumers.
– Products could be certfed as made with acceptable wage rates and 
working conditons. Fair trade and Green Labeaing haie indeed 
deieloped as a bitim-up global strategy.
Trade and Cuature
• Some actiists belieie that trade destroys local culture in other countries.
– There is a trade-of between increased iarietes within each country 
and decreased cross-country iariety. Global producton is linked with 
standardizatin and low cost of producton.
– Yet diferent local cultures may suriiie eien within natonal borders 
(think of Italian regional food culture).
– Cultural diiersity may be the result of minorites’ mire intense efirt 
ti transmit their cuature…
– ...Joint with aicaa priductin certfcatin (again, an ant-competton 
policy?) and bitim-up deveaipment if aicaa markets, km-0 
actvites and Siciaa Cinsumptin Griups.
